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Gariepy: Human Rights in North Korea

Introduction
On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).1 The underlying intent was to create a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.2 While the UDHR itself is not
legally binding, its principles set forth the foundation for nearly all, modern international human
rights treatises.3 There is perhaps no greater challenge to the claimed ‘universality’ and
enforceability of these principles, from a theoretical and practical perspective, than the
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).4
The DPRK has created a culture of pervasive impunity and lack of accountability for
systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations within their territory. 5 Respect for
individual human rights, such as those rights that are defined within the UDHR, simply does not
appear to exist within the DPRK.6 In contrast, implementation and enforcement of these very
same rights have flourished within the Democratic Republic of South Korea.7 In order to
understand this ideological divergence on the Korean peninsula, it is necessary to analyze the
claimed universality of international human rights in relation to the current state of human rights
within the DPRK. This analysis highlights both the limitations of international human rights law
as well as the importance of several political factors unique to the DPRK, impacting the
suitability of such rights therein.

1

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 DECEMBER 1948, 217 A (III), available
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html.
2
Id.
3
See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
4
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
A/HRC/25/63, (7 February 2014) [hereinafter, HRC REPORT], available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.63.doc.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4, available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org.
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The remainder of this article is divided into three parts. Part I addresses the universality
of international human rights law, Part II focuses on national law and policies inherent within the
DPRK impacting universal application therein. Following this analysis, Part III will provide a
quantitative analysis of the history and current state of international human rights within the
DPRK.
Part I: The Universality of International Human Rights Law
The system of international law in general, and international human rights law in
particular, is no longer content with stating its principles; it wants them to be actually adhered to.8
Underpinning international human rights law is the principle of universal applicability.
Something that is universal relates to everyone in the world or everyone in a particular group or
society. As such, international human rights are those rights that relate to all human beings
within the world. Without universality, the nature and scope of these rights would remain
relative to the culture in which they are implemented. In order to ensure that these rights are
actually adhered to, it is imperative to disentangle them from cultural considerations. It is only
when these rights are viewed as being prominent over cultural considerations that governments
become compelled to implement them, in spite of cultural considerations.
International organizations, such as the United Nations, have achieved tremendous
success in prescribing international human rights.9 Regional organizations, such as the European
Court of Human Rights, have become instrumental in adjudicating these rights.10 However,
primary responsibility for the enforcement of these rights remains with the State parties

8

PHILLIPE DELMAS, THE ROSY FUTURE OF WAR (1997).
See The 20th Anniversary of OHCHR—20 Human Rights Achievements, available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/OHCHR20_Backup/Pages/Achievements.aspx
10
Leo F. Zwaak & Therese Cachia, The European Court of Human Rights: A Success Story?, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF,
VOL. 11, ISS. 3 [2004].
9
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themselves.11 As such, if a State is either unwilling or unable to enforce these rights, it is a moot
point as to whether or not they are universal in theory.
The evolution of international human rights law can best be understood by analyzing
three interrelated historical ideological debates. The first, and perhaps most contentious debate,
focuses on the relationship between these rights and the particular culture within the society in
which they were implemented in. The second debate centers on whether or not these rights are
individual or collective in nature. Finally, the third historical debate highlights the inherent
tension between individual rights and individual duties within a particular society.
A. Universalism versus Cultural Relativism
According to the universalistic approach, international human rights treaties are nothing
more than the codification and expansion of those rights previously identified as natural rights,
representing the most effective response yet devised to a wide range of standard threats to
human dignity.12 These rights, following the manifest literal sense of the term, are ordinarily
understood to be the rights that one has simply because one is human.13 Moreover, human rights
are often held to be universal in the sense that most societies and cultures have practiced human
rights throughout most of their history.14
Cultural relativism, in contrast to universalism, stands for the proposition that human
rights are relative in nature to the particular culture that they are part of.15 Since cultures vary
across time and space, human rights among those cultures vary as well. In its purest form,

11

See UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS : RESOLUTION /
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 8 JANUARY 2008, A/RES/62/61, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/478f60c52.html.
12
See Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 281 (2007).
13
Id., at 282.
14
Id.at 284.
15
JIYOUNG SONG, HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN NORTH KOREA: POST-COLONIA, MARXIST, AND CONFUCIAN
PERSPECTIVES 36 (Routledge 2011).
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cultural relativism can be defined as “the acknowledgment of equal validity of diverse patterns of
life.” 16 Since neither superiority nor inferiority exists when judging different cultural practices,
the paramount consideration is for tolerance of those conventions that may differ from one’s
own.17 Tolerance, unlike respect, “does not require wholly acknowledging or embracing other
cultures within a society but only noninterference with others’ value systems and cultural
practices.” 18
In the context of human rights, proponents of cultural relativism argue that respect for
cultural differences must be taken into account in determining the suitability of a particular
human rights norm within that particular culture.19 Critics of cultural relativism assail this
theory as merely a convenient excuse for not advancing international human rights.20 In their
opinion, “no culture or comprehensive doctrine is by nature, or in any given or fixed way, either
compatible or incompatible with human rights.” 21 In other words, since cultures are malleable in
nature, there is nothing indigenous within a culture that would prevent a majority of its members
from endorsing human rights, if they chose to do so.22
B. Individual versus Collective Rights
Underpinning the competing theories of universalism and cultural relativism is a fierce
debate regarding the relative value of the individual over the collective body within a given
society, as well as the primacy of individual rights over the individual’s duties to the state. In a
holistic sense, “human rights concerns the relationship between the individual and the state; it

16

Id.
Id.
18
Id. at 37.
19
Id.
20
See DONNELLY, supra note 13.
21
Id. at 291.
22
Id.
17
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involves the status, claims, and duties of the former in the jurisdiction of the latter.” 23 There
remains significant debate as to whether these rights apply to individuals, collective groups or
both. Cultures, such as the one within the DPRK, where identity and responsibility are seen as
being collective, simply do not have the same understanding of the rights of the individual as
cultures where identity and responsibility are viewed as belonging to the individual. 24
Individualists, refuting the notion of collective rights, argue that human rights are universal in
nature and “are rights that belong to every human being in virtue of her or his common
humanity [and] exist whether or not the government recognizes them.” 25 As such, collective
rights are usually little better than excuses for violating individual rights.26
Broadening the concept of 'rights' to include collective groups will not only undermine the
basic conception of rights, it threatens the distinction between human rights and legal rights.27
To have any meaning then, human rights must be understood to exist independent and superior to
the civil liberties rights guaranteed by the state itself.28 International human rights are
revolutionary in nature because they “sweep away, in one fell swoop, all the grounds through
which the subordination of some individuals, groups or categories of people to others had been
justified.” 29 By making rights individualistic in nature, international human rights law makes any
claims based on rank, birth, and status inherently flawed in nature.
Collective rights (also commonly referred to as group rights) are creatures of the state
itself.30 As such, they “are created by association and lack the independent authority of

23

DONNELLY, supra note 13, at 285.
DELMAS, supra note 9, at 119.
25
SONG, supra note 16, at 41.
26
Jin-Xue Fan, On the Two Sides of Human Rights, 9 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 79, 82 (2003).
27
Id.
28
Michael Goodhart, Origins and Universality in the Human Rights Debates: Cultural Essentialism and the
Challenge of Globalization, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 935, 946 (2003).
29
Id.
30
FAN, supra note 27.
24

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

5

International Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 3

universal human rights.” 31 Generally, “collective rights are not as favorably regarded simply
because many people endorse first-order normative views according to which the interests of
individual people are of over-riding importance and that individuals should not bear duties for
the sake of collectivities.” 32 Proponents of collective rights believe that “no one can acquire a
right except as a member of a society in which some common good is recognized by all
members.” 33
Marxist ideology, the epitome of a collective rights theory, reasoned that human rights
are neither universal nor inherent. Arguing that universal human rights within capitalistic
regimes are illusory in nature, merely concealing inequality through formal and empty
practices, Marx concludes that these regimes fail to uphold even the most basic of human rights
of their citizens. 34 In contrast, within Marxist ideology, human rights are only guaranteed to
members of the proletariat society who share the same goals as the surrounding society, the party,
and ultimately the leader.” 35 As such, it is membership not individualism within Marxist ideology
that confers human rights. Similarly, the North Korean Dictionary of the Works of the Great
Leader Kim Il Sun incongruously defines individualism as an ideology of the exploitative
class.” 36
Collectivism, on the other hand, is celebrated because it prioritizes collective interests in support
of the collective struggle for society, the People, the Party and the revolution.” 37 Such policies,
promoting collective rights at the expense of individual rights, in turn promote individual duties
at the expense of individual rights. This is problematic because, as demonstrated by the history

31

Id. at 82.
Leslie Green, Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 315 (1991).
33
SONG, supra note 16, at 39.
34
Eric Engle, Human Rights According to Marxism, 65 GUILD PRAC. 249 (2008).
35
Id.
36
DICTIONARY OF THE WORKS OF THE GREAT LEADER K IM IL SUNG, SCIENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA PRESS (1982).
37
SONG, supra note 16, at 105.
32
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of the DPRK addressed below, promoting individual duties at the expense of individual rights
can result in widespread and systemic human rights violations.
C. Individual Rights versus Individual Duties
Similarly, the relationship between individual rights and individual duties is rooted in a
fundamental disagreement over the source of human rights.38 Individualists argue that, since
humanity is the source of all human rights, these rights exist independent from civil liberties.39
This is important because civil liberties, unlike human rights, can be stripped away by depriving
an individual of his status within a particular society. Malcolm X explained these relationships
succinctly when he declared that civil liberties are things that you are asking ‘Uncle Sam’ to
give you whilst human rights are things you were born with.40
In contrast, the Soviet concept of human rights rested on the premise that “the interests of
the state and the individual were coterminous, and that rights did not inhere in individuals by
virtue of their humanity but derived from the state and reflected its stage of development.”41
Simply put, “human rights could not be conceived outside the state.” 42 While the importance of
individual duties is clearly reflected in traditional Western philosophy, attempts to codify a
Universal Declaration of Individual Responsibilities 43 failed miserably.44 The concern was “that
duties would be overpowering rather than complementary to rights, that they would be used as an
alternative force for evil, rather than as an additional force for good.” 45

38

See GREEN, supra note 33.
Id.
40
Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (2014).
41
SONG, supra note 16, at 165.
42
Id.
43
Inter-Action Council, A Universal Declaration of Responsibilities (Sept. 1, 1997), available at
http://www.interactioncouncil.org/udhr/declaration/udhr.pdf.
44
Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the International Human Rights
Movement, 8 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEV. L. J. 67 (2005).
45
Id. at 81.
39
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While Christians often model their behavior after the Bible, North Koreans have been
forced to seek guidance from the scripture of juche ideology, that is, the directions of Kim Il Sung
and the words of Kim Jong-Il, so that they think and behave based upon their directions and
words.46 In contrast to the Ten Commandments of the Christian faith, the Ten Great Principles
regulate and judge every word and action of the people in North Korea.47 Officially announced
by Kim Jong Il in 1974, these regulations govern the everyday lives of the North Korean
people.48 As such, the underlying natural law foundation supporting individual rights has
essentially been misappropriated by the DPRK in furtherance of the government's own political
mandate.49 In order to understand how this occurred, it is necessary to gain a better
understanding of the internal ideologies of the DPRK.
Part II: Understanding the DPRK
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a nation formed via revolution and forged
through war, remains an extraordinary historical anachronism that simply cannot be
understood apart from his history.50 This miserable history, shaped by a brutal foreign occupation
and never-ending fratricidal war, truly defined the ideology of the DPRK.51 The longevity and
insolubility of the Korean conflict “makes it the best example in the world of how easy it is to
get into a war and how hard it is to get out.” 52 Following the Korean conflict, “Kim Il Sung
cut his nation off from the world in search of an ancient Korean ideal, a self-sufficient Hermit

46

See Philo Kim, An Analysis of Religious Forms of Juche Ideology in comparison with Christianity, INT'L
JOURNAL OF KOREAN UNIFICATION STUDIES, VOL. 11, NO. 1, 127, 138 (2002).
47
Id.
48
A listing of these principles is available at http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=10829.
49
Id.
50
See Johnathan D. Pollack, Korean Unification: Illusion or Aspiration?, 8 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 77, 79 (20012002).
51
Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (The New Press 2004).
52
Id. at 3.
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Kingdom.” 53 To achieve, and more importantly preserve this Kingdom, Kim Il Sung
embraced the philosophy of Juche and the Songbun classification system.54 Each of these
ideological tools, individually and collectively, have had a tremendous impact on the viability
of human rights in the DPRK55 and will be addressed separately below.
A. Juche
Steeped in the Stalinist dogmas of the 1940's and 50's, the DPRK formed North Korea
into a mature socialist society.56 By 1960, the DPRK broke with the former Soviet Union and
began an anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese campaign.57 The DPRK was to become a political anomaly,
becoming more and more illiberal and isolationist, clutching to Stalinist dogmas abandoned by
all other communist regimes.58 The juche ideology of self-reliance was born out of this
separatist campaign.59 An understanding of the origins, components and philosophical
underpinnings of the juche ideology is essential to an understanding of the DPRK and its
people.60
To begin with, etymologically, ju means ‘being master of one’s body’, and che is ‘a
body’ or ‘an entity’. 61 As such, juche means ‘being master of one’s body’, which can be
interpreted as ‘sovereign autonomy’, ‘self-determination’, or ‘self-reliance’.62 In
addressing the significance of juche, Kim Il Sung explained that “establishing juche means,
in a nutshell, being the master of revolution and reconstruction in one’s own country.” 63
53

Id. at 150.
Id.
55
Id.
56
SONG, supra note 16.
57
CUMINGS, supra note 53.
58
SONG, supra note 16.
59
CUMINGS, supra note 53.
60
Id.
61
SONG, supra note 14, at 123.
62
Id.
63
Grace Lee, The Political Philosophy of Juche, STANFORD JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFF., VOL. 3, NO. 1, 105, 105
54
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Correspondingly, juche requires “holding fast to an independent position, rejecting
dependence on others, using one’s own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying
the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving one’s own problems for oneself on
one’s own responsibility under all circumstances.” 64
Drawing upon Confucian ideology, juche attempts to revive the state philosophy of
independence espoused by the original Korea rulers.65 Thus, juche, the governing principle of
all aspects of North Korean life and the ideological basis of all state policies, quickly gained the
full authority of Kim Il Sung’s ‘god like’ status.66 Sung “successfully wielded the juche idea as
a political shibboleth to evoke a fiercely nationalistic drive for North Korean independence and
to justify policies of self-reliance and self-denial.” 67
From a human rights perspective, the fundamental problem with juche is that the term
‘self’ within the notions of self-reliance and self-denial refers to the Nation as an indivisible and
sacred entity and not the individual.68 In fact, “the notion that individuals are not worthy of living
if they are deprived of their nation has been promoted so persuasively that complete loyalty to the
nation is considered natural.” 69 This is best personified by early DPRK human rights discourse
which, under the collective principles of juche, declared that “everyone in North Korea enjoys a
happy life with guaranteed political rights, no social vices, and no worries over food, clothes, or
consumption, no joblessness, no homelessness, free medical treatment and free education.” 70
Having already “established the infallibility of the juche philosophy”71, the veracity of

(2003).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 110.
66
Id., at 111.
67
Id., at 105.
68
Cumings, supra note 52, at 159.
69
Id.
70
Song, supra note 16, at 134.
71
Lee, supra note 64, at 111.
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this claim simply becomes irrelevant. This belief system, engrained within the North Korean
psyche at the earliest age, makes them docile and loyal to Kim Il Sung even in the face of
famines and energy crises that have devastated the country.72 While juche may help explain this
docility, it is actually the songbun classification system that is most debilitating to the
implementation of human rights within North Korean society.73 Songbun “has an impact on
human rights in North Korea that is incalculable and interminable in its highly destructive and
repressive effects on the vast multitude of the North Korean population.” 74
B. Songbun
Songbun was initially implemented “as a social class restructuring to reverse the old
Confucian feudal system of the Chosun Dynasty and Japanese colonialism [in order to] empower
the working class.” 75 Ironically, not only has songbun failed to achieve this goal, it has created
unrenowned class differences within Korean society.76 Etymologically, songbun means
“ingredients or material.” 77 Therefore, the DPRK employs this word “to refer to one’s
sociopolitical background.”78
The DPRK equates an individual’s class status in relation to their perceived loyalty to the
nation and supreme leader, instead of their social class.79 In order to achieve this goal, “the
songbun system identifies, assesses, categorizes, and politically stratifies each North Korean
resident as a political asset or liability to the socialist revolution and the regime in general and to

72

Id.
Robert Collins, Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System (2012)
available at https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf.
74
Id., at 1.
75
Id. at 9.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 6.
78
Id.
79
SONG, supra note 16.
73
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the ruling Kim family specifically.” 80 The DPRK officially divides the North Korean population
into three classes with only those deemed loyal to the nation being entitled to human rights. 81
At the top of the social class structure is the haek-sim kyechung, or core class, which is embodied
by twenty-five to thirty percent of the regime’s most favored individuals, i.e., political leaders, the
military elite, and members of the Workers Party of Korea. 82 Under the songbun system, this
group, assessed by the regime to be loyal to the nation and the Kim regime, is clearly entitled to
human rights.83

80

Id.
Id. at 104.
82
Ralph Hassig & Kongdan Oh, THE HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE HERMIT KINGDOM
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2009).
83
Collins, supra note 74, at 7.
81
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Fifty percent of the population, such as technicians, teachers, and enlisted soldiers,
belongs to the tong-yo kyechung, or wavering class.84 This class is determined to be of
questionable loyalty to the regime and is entitled to human rights so long as they serve the
regime well through proper economic and political performance.85 Based on their questionable
loyalty, “the party assesses that constant ideological indoctrination is essential to maintaining the
reliability of the wavering class.” 86
The bottom twenty-five to thirty percent of the North Korean population is the jok-tae
kyechung, or hostile class. 87 This class is comprised of individuals perceived as carrying
‘political taint,’ including defectors, relatives of defectors, and former landowners and
merchants. 88 This class is assessed as “disloyal to the socialist revolution, the party, and its
leadership, members of this class are regarded as enemy by the Kim regime, and they suffer
the most traumatic victimization of the songbun system.”

89

Members of the hostile class, as

enemies of the regime, are not entitled to any human rights. 90
Songbun is further broken down into two subcategories, chulsin songbun and sahoe
songbun, with the former referring to the socio-economic background of an individual’s
extended family, while the latter refers to an individual’s socio-political and economic
performance and behavior.91 While an individual’s songbun is hereditary , since it can
decrease based on perceived disloyalty to the Nation or ruling party, it is not completely static
in nature.

92

For example, “conviction of a political crime— particularly slander against the

84

Ralph Hassig & Kongdan Oh, NORTH KOREA: THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (2000).
Collins, supra note 74, at 7.
86
Id.
87
Hassig & Oh, supra note 83, at 201.
88
Hassig & Oh, supra note 83, at 133.
89
Collins, supra note 74, at 7.
90
Hassig & Oh, supra note 85.
91
Id.
92
Collins, supra note 74.
85
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Kim regime—will not only cause one’s songbun level to fall to rock bottom, but so will that of
one’s family members up to third-degree relatives, which will last for generations.” 93
In contrast, while not impossible, “moving up in the songbun requires a lifetime of
devotion to the Kim family regime, the party, and their teaching.” 94 This vicious circle is
precisely what makes songbun such an effective tool in preserving the status quo within the
DPRK and North Korean society.95 This classification system, expressly denying the
inherent dignity of the individual, “is by its very nature a violation of human rights.” 96
Part III: The Current Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK
In order to fully appreciate the scope and depravity of the DPRK’s violations of human
rights within North Korea, it is important to first identify their international legal obligations.
Currently, the DPRK is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (including the Optional Protocols), and is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. 97
These treaties, in contrast to the aspirational UDHR, are legally binding and the act of
ratifying these treaties requires a certain degree of relinquishment of sovereignty on the part of the
state.98 Ratifying these treaties obligates the DPRK to undertake steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, to achieve the full realization of the rights recognized

93

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 86.
97
United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Status of Ratification,
available at: http://indicators.ohchr.org.
98
See Morse H. Tan, State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS L. J. 681, 687 (2010-2011).
94
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within each of these treaties. 99 At a minimum, in accordance with customary international law100,
the DPRK must refrain from ideological policies such as juche and songbun, which frustrate the
intent and purpose of these treaties.101 As the recently released UN Human Rights Council report
makes clear, the DPRK has failed to achieve even these minimal standards.102 In order to
understand the depth of this failure, it is necessary to analyze the recently released United Nations
Human Rights Council Report on North Korea, to determine whether or not juche and songbun
constitute crimes against humanity.
A. UN Human Rights Council Report on North Korea
The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations
system made up of 47 States responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights
around the globe.103 On 21 March 2013, at its 22nd session, the United Nations Human Rights
Council established the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK).104 Resolution A/HRC/RES/22/13 mandates the body to investigate
the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that
may amount to crimes against humanity.105 The resulting report confirmed, “systematic,
widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the

99

See UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, P. 3, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html.
100
Customary international law is composed only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2nd Cir. 2003).
101
United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 18, 23 May 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html.
102
HRC Report supra note 5.
103
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/hrcindex.aspx.
104
UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: resolution /
adopted by the Human Rights Council , 14 July 2013, A/HRC/RES/22/13, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/53c3bb5d4.html
105
Id.
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” 106 These violations included torture, inhumane
treatment, arbitrary detention, denial of the right to life, limited freedom of movement, and
enforced disappearances. 107 The Human Rights Commission concluded, recognizing the
influence of juche, that “the particular nature and the overall scale of human rights violations in
the State can be more easily understood through an appreciation of the nature of its political
system.” 108
Furthermore, songbun, according to the Commission, represents the “most important
factor in determining where individuals are allowed to live; what sort of accommodation they
have; what occupations they are assigned to; whether they are effectively able to attend school,
in particular university; how much food they receive; and even whom they might marry.” 109
Additionally, songbun has resulted in a “socioeconomically and physically segregated society,
where people considered politically loyal to the leadership can live and work in favorable
locations, whereas families of persons who are considered politically suspect are relegated to
marginalized areas.” 110 The DPRK, adhering to the tenants of juche, have implemented nearly
an absolute ban on foreign travel in violation of fundamental human rights.111
Notwithstanding the ban on travelling abroad, “nationals still take the risk of fleeing,
mainly to China.” 112 Former DPRK security officials, pursuant to a policy dating back to the
early 1990s, may shoot to kill anyone attempting to cross the border. 113 A former State Security
Department (SSD) agent involved in border control indicated that border guards who shoot at
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DPRK citizens trying to flee the country are not punished. 114 The SSD considers anyone who
illegally flees to China to be a traitor, no matter their reason, and does not “treat them as
human.” 115 In turn, China continues to pursue a rigorous policy of forcibly repatriating citizens
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who cross the border illegally, in contravention
of its obligations under the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and the
Convention's 1967 Protocol. 116
As a result, North Korea’s border crossers are left heavily dependent on lawful residents
in China willing to risk aid, vulnerable to exploitation by the human trafficking trade, and in
constant danger of repatriation and brutal punishment by the DPRK regime. 117 When repatriated,
these individuals are subjected “to persecution, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention and, in
some cases, sexual violence.” 118 Juche and songbun, working together, thus create a vicious
cycle of discrimination and violence amounting to crimes against humanity.119
B. Juche and Songbun May Constitute Crimes against Humanity
Under international law, crimes against humanity “entail gross human rights violations of
a scale and level of organization that shock the conscience of humanity.” 120 Crimes against
humanity require both a specific intent, as well as a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population.121 An attack is ‘widespread’ if it involves “massive, frequent, large
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scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims.” 122 A ‘systematic attack’ requires “organized action, following a regular
pattern, on the basis of a common policy and involves substantial public or private resources….
[T]here must exist some form of preconceived plan or policy.” 123 While theoretically some
attacks can be classified as either widespread or systematic, in practice, there is significant
overlap between these two categories. Within North Korea, the DPRK has committed, and
continues to commit, a wide variety of crimes satisfying these criteria. 124
C. The United Nations Security Council—A Lost Opportunity
On 18 December 2014, the United Nations General Assembly addressed the situation of
human rights in the DPRK. 125 The General Assembly condemned the long-standing and
ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and encouraged the United Nations Security Council to take appropriate
action to ensure accountability. 126 In response to this request, on 23 December 2014, the
United Nations Security Council convened at an emergency meeting, to address the
situation in the DPRK. 127 During this meeting, Mr. Lie Jieyi of China, asserted that “the
Security Council is not the forum designed for involvement in human rights issues, and
still less should human rights issues be politicized.” 128 Mr. Simonovic, representing the
United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights, responded by declaring that “real
122
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change in the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of Korea will not only
require reform; it also demands justice.” 129 Based on the nature of the allegations
contained within the HRC Report, Mr. Simonovic concluded that it was the “international
community’s responsibility to take action to prevent and punish such crimes.” 130
Chapter V of the United Nations Charter lays out the general powers and functions of
the Security Council131. Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, confers on the Security Council,
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.132 Moreover,
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council.133 Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is tasked with the responsibility to
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
to decide what measures shall be taken in response thereto. 134 Similarly, the Security Council is
charged with investigating any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction
or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 135
Maintaining peace and security is the Council's primary, but not only, mandate.136
Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,
is a further purpose of the UN identified in Article 1 section 3 of the United Nations Charter.137
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
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the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), under Chapter VII powers,
demonstrates the ability of the Security Council to establish and direct international criminal
prosecutions, as a tool for promoting international peace and security.138 Following the entry
into force of the Rome Statute in 2002,139 the authority to establish ad hoc international
criminal tribunals has been replaced by Security Council’s ability to refer cases to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).140
Crimes against Humanity, such as those being committed by the DPRK, fall within the
jurisdiction of the ICC. 141 Unfortunately, the Human Rights Council lacks the authority to refer
these crimes to the ICC,142 however, in accordance with Article 13 of the Rome Statute, the
Security Council has authority to refer these crimes to the ICC for investigation and possible
adjudication.143 Article 13 of the Rome Statute provides that the Court may exercise
jurisdiction over statutory crimes referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations. 144 The Security Council has exercised its authority to
refer crimes to the ICC on several occasions, including the adoption of Security Council
Resolutions 1593145 and 1970,146 referring the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya
respectively. The Security Council’s failure to refer the situation in North Korea to the ICC is
simply inexcusable.
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Conclusion
International scrutiny of the human rights situation within the DPRK has been farreaching with minimal success. Oscillating between carrots and sticks, efforts by the
international human rights community to persuade the DPRK into protecting the human rights of
their citizenry remain ineffective. The HRC Report clearly demonstrates that this external
pressure has had little impact on the DPRK. While national authorities remain primarily
responsible for safeguarding the human rights of their citizenry, when they manifestly fail to
fulfill this responsibility, it is important to the credibility of the United Nations Security Council
to make a referral of the situation to the ICC.147
While international scrutiny has achieved some residual successes, such as coaxing
border reform measures within the People’s Republic of China, focusing on the symptoms of the
problem does little to ameliorate the problem itself. As a result of the underlying ideologies of
juche and songbun, coupled with Kimilsungism, meaningful human rights reform within North
Korea must be internal in nature to have any chance of success. Although the DPRK has ratified
nearly all, major international human rights treaties148, incorporating many treaty provisions into
the national constitution, they continue to selectively enforce these provisions based on an
individual’s songbun status.149 This is important because, “to the extent that the law and the
justice system serve to legitimize violations, there is a rule by law in the DPRK, but no rule of
law, upheld by an independent and impartial judiciary.” 150 Even where relevant checks have
been incorporated into statutes, these can be disregarded with impunity.” 151
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While the DPRK’s internal ideological framework is somewhat unique, historical
similarities do exist. For example, “the turning point for Marxism was the calcification of the
communist party…when Marxism in practice became seen as the collective oppression of the
individual, rather than as a force for liberation, the moral force of legitimation of that ideology
was lost and thus its capacity for expansion was also lost.” 96 In other words, when an “ideology
of liberation that does not in fact liberate, but instead stagnates and oppresses…it loses all power
of legitimation.” 152 This highlights that “when the Soviet system degenerated into rule by the
party, for the party, that system was doomed thereby.” 153 The question remains whether or not
the same fate awaits the DPRK.
While international human rights are universal in nature, they are also fragile and
susceptible to abuse by regimes such as the DPRK. If international human rights are to flourish
throughout the Korean Peninsula, the international community must remain resolute in their
belief of universality and continue to hold the DPRK accountable for their violations. They
must not question whether or not the pump of international human rights law works, but instead
focus their collective efforts in prosecuting the DPRK for taking away its handle.
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